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of how their members are voting. Here it would seem
clear that legislators are accountable to their party leaders.
The second half of the book is an attempt to measure
the relative accountability of legislators in countries where
voting is visible. Carey uses several measures or indices of
‘voting unity’ within parties. Such indices may not get at
how responsive legislators are to their constituents, but
they can give an idea of the relative accountability of par-
ties: if legislators’ voting patterns demonstrate no unity,
then party label carries no informational value. Carey con-
centrates on three indices: how consistently party mem-
bers vote the same way; how often they win; and how
often losses might have been avoided had greater unity
been shown. The latter measure is important, since rebel-
lion is cheap if it is known it will not affect the result.
RICE (a measure developed by Stuart Rice in 1925) is a
measure of cross-voting by party members varying from 0
(equal number vote aye and nay) to 1 (they all vote the
same way). Since RICE does not count abstentions, Carey
proposes his new measure UNITY where the cross-voting
proportions as shares of all members of the relevant party
in the legislature. Thus UNITY also varies between 0 and
1 though obviously dips more easily as it takes account of
abstentions. By combining these measure Carey creates
RICE and UNITY indices for a number of countries and
then compares these in a series of graphs plus tables of
averages and standard deviations. We see some substantial
differences across countries, but also across time within
countries and across parties within a country.
What do we learn about institutional design from Carey’s
careful empirics? He addresses this question in Chapter 6,
entitled “Explaining Voter Unity.” There are a number of
hypotheses in the literature that attempt to explain party
discipline. Parliamentary systems are supposed to have more
disciplined parties than presidential ones since the elec-
toral link is clearer in the former; federalism is supposed
to create divisions within parties, fostering less discipline;
whilst electoral systems that foster competition within par-
ties should create less unity as members vie for the votes of
constituents. Of course these generalizations do not always
hold; some presidential systems look more like parliamen-
tary ones and political culture, the last explanatory refuge
of the institutionalist scoundrel, can account for some
divergencies from true form. Drawing a set of hypotheses
from the literature, Carey examines them using his data.
He finds that electoral rules matter; federalism seems to
have no effect; and a popularly elected president does lead
to greater disunity for governing parties in parliament but
has no effect on opposition parties. It seems presidents
create a new principal, partially eclipsing parliamentary
leadership.
This book provides an important addition to legislative
studies, furnishing new arguments and data at the legisla-
tor level to show how parties and legislatures are affected
by institutional differences. In that regard it is an impor-
tant book. Yet, despite a final chapter that addresses the
question, I have doubts about the link between the early
discussion of lines of accountability and the empirics dis-
played here. Degree of unity might measure how well the
line of party accountability works, but on its own cannot
measure direct accountability to constituents; lack of unity
might come from many different sources. To examine the
constituent legislator link we need more information on
ideological elements within parties, and the issues on which
we would expect legislators to take more account of their
constituents’ views. Such information is absent from this
book. But all books have their limits. And Legislative Vot-
ing and Accountability provides both new data and impor-
tant insights into the links between legislators, parties,
and representation.
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A number of interesting recent works have focused on the
significance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
in Palestinian society and politics. Among the most impor-
tant have been Rema Hammami’s titled “NGOs: The Pro-
fessionalization of Politics” (Race and Class 37 [January
1995]: 51–63), Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar’s (2005) The
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite: Donors, Inter-
national Organizations and Local NGOs, and Aid, Diplo-
macy and Facts on the Ground, edited by Michael Keating
et al. (2005), which focuses on the effect of foreign dona-
tions on Palestinian society and economy. Benoît Chal-
land’s book is a significant addition to this corpus.
Challand’s main argument is that “the overuse of civil
society and its subtle imposition by external actors might
become a source of heteronomy for the Palestinians,” as
donor-driven, “civil society” discourse does not admit the
needs, concerns, and ideas of the Palestinian people them-
selves (p. 164). Challand defines heteronomy as the inabil-
ity of a particular group to make and adhere to its own
laws, and suggests that both the discursive performances
of the NGOs and the demands of the donors in effect
exclude Palestinians from participatory processes and exac-
erbate the heteronomy forced on Palestinians by Israeli
occupation. To make this argument, he focuses on health-
provision and advocacy NGOs, respectively. The book is
based on interviews with representatives of more than 50
NGOs and more than 40 donor organisations.
Palestinian Civil Society is divided into two parts. In
the first part, scholarly civil society debates are summa-
ried, and Challand offers an interesting suggestion that
rather than viewing civil society as a vehicle for democ-
ratization, it should be seen as an architect of political
autonomy. The author conceives of autonomy along the
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lines of Rousseau’s Social Contract, maintaining that “the
ultimate test of human freedom resides in the fact that the
group (‘l’état civil ’) has the capacity to give and agree on
its own laws. . . . In this process, the participation of each
member of the social contract is the necessary component
to this process of legislation” (p. 35). He then usefully
(and unusually) examines Arab theorizations of civil soci-
ety in light of this conceptualization, outlining three dif-
ferent views regarding the reality and possibility of civil
society in the Arab Middle East. Challand describes Azmi
Bishara’s analysis as skeptical, where Bishara does not see
civil society as a fully autonomous sphere of political action;
summarizes Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s conceptualization as pes-
simistic vis-à-vis Islamists, and therefore as cautious and
potentially exclusive toward them; and celebrates the more
inclusive theorization of Burhan Ghalioun, which con-
ceives of civil society as inclusive of all political actors.
Challand also usefully sketches the historical background
of Palestinian NGOs since the 1970s.
In the second part of the book, the author provides a
detailed analysis of the international donors and their spe-
cific approaches to civil society, a careful interrogation of
the modus operandi of health-provision and advocacy
NGOs and the way they deploy civil society discourses,
and a critical reading of the mechanisms by which these
NGOs politically, sociologically, and ideologically exclude
the very people whose political participation would be the
fundamental basis of political autonomy. These mecha-
nisms include donor emphasis on projects that are aimed
at supporting the defunct “peace process,” rather than local
needs and demands; the professionalization of the NGO
leadership which rather than depoliticizing the NGOs pro-
duces a peculiar kind of homogenous and implicit poli-
tics; the creation of a class of globalized elite more responsive
to international donors than to their Palestinian constitu-
ency; and a Eurocentric hierarchy that privileges certain
familiar NGO organizational structures over more indig-
enous civil society forms.
Challand’s research is fascinating, and the basic argu-
ment is sound. The focus on participation—rather than
the devalued and contested concept of “democratiza-
tion”—is innovative and useful beyond the bounds of
Palestine. His knowledge of Arabic and his firsthand inter-
views with so many NGO operatives also means that a
great deal of the research material here is new and not
easily available elsewhere. Furthermore, although his cri-
tique of the concept of civil society does not go far enough
(after all, as scholars such as Zygmunt Bauman have
argued, today the “social” inherent in “civil society” explic-
itly elbows out political engagement and contestation),
nevertheless, it is a sobering addition to the growing
body of literature that has explicitly challenged the civil-
society-promotion industry.
I wish that the book—which is cognizant of the way
civil society has largely been reified and reduced to NGOs
(p. 30)—had actually spent some time looking at other
“civil society” institutions, such as unions or popular com-
mittees, that have been such a significant part of Palestin-
ian politics. Furthermore, although Challand goes further
than most in his discussion of Islamic and Islamist non-
governmental organizations, the fascinating material here
is all too brief and leaves one wanting more.
As a final substantive point, one wishes that instead of
the rather long-winded “ground clearing” in Part I, more
pages had been devoted specifically to the encounter
between the NGOs and the Palestinian population they
ostensibly serve. Although Challand provides interesting
abstract analyses here, it would have been extremely useful
(and also novel) if we could have had a brief ethnography
of the precise way in which NGO professionals deal in a
quotidian context with the people who come to them for
support.
More pedantically, the book is badly served by the pub-
lisher, who has not provided any copyediting, resulting in
errors in word usage, such as “unaccessible” instead of
“inaccessible” (p. 13), “predicator” instead of “predictor”
(p. 29), “apparition” instead of “appearance” (p. 142), and
so on. In some places, particularly in discussions of theory,
the lack of any proofreading by the publisher has rendered
the text more complicated than it should be. This care-
lessness is a shame, given that the intelligent and critical
Challand has conducted extensive and thoughtful pri-
mary research in the Arabic language, and given that the
book advances an important and novel argument about
foreign donors exacerbating Palestinian heteronomy. He
points the way toward a more critical examination of NGOs
and civil society, and his fidelity to on-the-ground field-
work is well worth emulating.
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While democratization has long been a major theme in
political science, recent years have seen a renewed interest
in the topic of dictatorship. Jennifer Gandhi’s book is a
welcome addition to this literature. Gandhi argues that
most autocrats need popular and elite support to remain
in power. Operating through pure coercion is costly and
risky. Dictators in her framework are not just concerned
with extracting rents from society. They also have policy
goals. Many powerful rulers thus accommodate represen-
tative political institutions to help them obtain informa-
tion on public and elite opinion and to facilitate bargaining.
They recognize that it is often better to include societal
groups in the process of governing than to risk a turn to
street protests, violence, or guerilla warfare. They may
accommodate wealthy elites that have the capacity to exit
for more promising opportunities abroad.
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